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Abstract 
The view that profitability, not growth, is the driving force behind the firm performance, and 
unprofitable high growth  can not  lead to financial success has often been discussed in the literature. 
In this study,  I tested this hypothesis on Turkey’s top 1000 data using  an  extended version of the 
method of Davidson et al. (2009). My sample strongly supports the hypothesis that controlling for 
leverage, low growth-high profitability (profit)  firms outperform high growth-low profitability (growth)  
firms regarding both directions of their transition to an upper state  and a lower state in  subsequent 
periods.  The hypothesis  that controlling for type of firm (growth or profit firm), leverage matters with 
respect to firm’s future performance is weakly supported by 3-year transition data.  
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1. Introduction 
Sales and sales growth are, no doubt, among the top objectives of firms. 
Surveying senior managers, Hubbard and Bromiley (1995) find sales as  the most 
common objective of management. However, the literature on the relationship 
between firm growth and profitability (or financial performance) is far from being 
harmonious with respect to both theoretical  views and empirical findings. The 
argument that  growth rate may be negatively related to firm performance proxied by 
profitability or efficiency goes  back to Penrose (1958) who assumes a negative 
relationship between firm growth and productivity growth (Penrose effects). On the 
other hand, many arguments affirm the positive influence of sales growth on 
profitability. For instance,  views based on scale economies, first mover advantages 
(Lee et al., 2000, Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), higher survival rates of larger 
firms (Aldrich and Auster, 1986), network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), 
learning curve benefits, etc., assert that rapid growth could, eventually, lead to high 
profitability. 
Evolutionary firm theory predicts a positive association between firm 
performance (i.e., profitability and efficiency) and firm market share (i.e., growth) in 
accordance with the “growth of the fitter” principle. Using  GMM panel data 
techniques on a sample of French manufacturing firms, Coad (2007) tested this 
hypothesis and  found that profit rates have a small positive influence on subsequent 
growth, and the reciprocal influence  of growth on profit rates is  positive and 
significant indicating  that there are no “Penrose effects”. Coad (2007) concludes  the 
evolutionary proposition that profitability is the main driver of firm growth is rejected 
by his data. 
Managerial theory of firm (Marris, 1964)  accepts that managers pursuing  their 
own interest can maximize growth instead of shareholders’ wealth even when this is  
harmful for  shareholders’ interest (Jensen, 1993). High growth, at the initial stages, 
through the exploitation of  profitable opportunities, creates more profits and then, 
beyond some points,  less favorable opportunities will be used, and eventually profits 
will decrease (Cubbin-Leech, 1986). Hence, managerial theory suggests an inverted 
U-shape relationship between firm growth and profitability, and  the existence of  a 
growth-profit trade-off  in the second phase of the process. Testing the agency 
hypothesis, Brush et al. (2000) found that cash flow increases sales growth, and 
sales growth increases performance (i.e., profitability, ROA) for three types of firms:  3  
Firms without free cash flow , firms with low free cash flow and owner-managed firms 
with low free cash flow. 
In contrast to the above views, high growth strategies, besides  big 
opportunities, represent at the same time substantial risk and challenges (Aaker and 
Day, 1986, Hambrick and Crozier, 1985, Markman and Gartner, 2002).  Fast growth 
necessitates extraordinary resources, mainly, heavy cash flows, external capital, new 
plant and equipment  investments, many new employees, a new firm structure, 
marketing and organizational scheme, etc. Moreover, a high growth market will 
attract new aggressive competitors who may have a low cost advantage or  better 
products. Besides, key success factors can change and the firm can not adapt. 
Finally, the firm can not hold its market position gained during the high growth period 
unless there is a sustainable competitive advantage (Aaker and Day, 1986).  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between growth and profitability is 
contradictory. Some empirical studies report results in support of a  positive 
relationship between growth and profitability. For example, Capon et al.(1990) argue 
that pursuing a high sales growth strategy  will yield a positive impact on profitability. 
Geroski et al. (1997), using a panel of large UK firms, find  no trace of any trade-off 
between growth and profitability in the data, furthermore,  they assert that  high (low) 
current period growth rates are reasonable predictors of increases (decreases) in 
long run profitability. Coad et al. (2010), using census data on Italian firms, find that 
sales growth is very strongly associated with subsequent growth of profits and mildly 
associated with subsequent productivity growth.  
Contrary to the above findings,  some studies (e.g., Jacopson and Aaker, 
1985, Shuman and Seeger, 1986, Chandler and Jansen, 1992, Markman and 
Gartner, 2002),  reported no significant relationship between firm growth and financial 
performance, while other studies  found a  negative relationship (e.g., Manu, 1993, 
Weisbord, 1994, Reid, 1995).     
In a recent paper, Davidsson et al. (2009), applying a resource-based 
approach, argued that high profitability permits the firm to build a resource-based 
competitive advantage and building such a valuable and hard-to-copy advantage 
may at first constrain growth. On the other hand, firm growth without profit is often not 
a sign of sound development. Growth is not direct evidence of effective value 
creation and appropriation which are the central tasks of entrepreneurial firms 
(p.390). Profitability (and the competitive advantage it reflects) is the horse that pulls  4  
the growth cart, rather than the other way around (p.389).  They empirically tested 
the hypothesis that  the firms with high profitability and low growth (profit  firms as 
they named them) are more likely to reach to a state of  high growth and high 
profitability (star firms) in subsequent periods  than  are  the firms with  high growth 
and low profitability (growth firms). They also tested a second hypothesis stating that  
the growth  firms are more likely to reach  a state of  low growth and low profitability 
(poor firms) than are the profit firms. Using   panels  of Australian and Swedish firms, 
they showed that the 1-year and 3-year transition probabilities of  profit and growth 
firms to the star and poor firms groups are indeed statistically different, and profit 
firms  are in a better position than the growth firms. Following  the same methodology 
of Davidsson et al. (2009), Jang (2010) also reached similar results for US restaurant 
firms.   
 In this study, I  extended   the method  of  Davidsson et al. (2009) to three 
dimensions by taking  the debt ratio (leverage) as a third measure to categorize firms 
besides growth and profitability, and applied  it to the Turkey’s top 1000 sample for 
1997-2009 period to test  hypotheses similar to those tested in  Davidsson et al. 
(2009).  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology, hypotheses to be tested and the data. Section 3  reports the empirical 
results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology, hypotheses and the data 
 
Davidsson et al. (2009) divide firms into 4 categories using  quartiles of  sales 
growth rates and return on assets (ROA): Growth (High growth - low profitability), 
profit (low growth – high profitability), star (high on both) and poor (low on both) firms. 
Then, they test two hypotheses: Profit firms are more likely  to become star firms (i.e., 
to reach an upper state) in subsequent periods than  are growth firms. Secondly, 
growth firms are more likely to become poor firms (i.e., to descend a lower state) in 
subsequent periods than are profit firms. For Australian data, they found that  the 
percentages of growth firms which passed to star and poor categories in the next 
period are 11.6% and 30.3%, respectively, while the these ratios for profit category 
firms are 29.6% and 11.0%. Profit firms outperform growth firms. Their likelihood to 
ascend to an upper ( star) category is three times higher and their likelihood to  5  
descend to  a lower category ( poor) is three times smaller than growth firms. 
Davidsson et al. (2009) control industry affiliates of firms by using  growth rates and 
profitability ratios  relative to the other firms in the industry (they divided firms data by  
the industry median). But they do not control firms’ debt ratios (leverages). A natural 
objection to their approach is that growth firms may be more leveraged compared to 
profit firms and this feature could be the main reason behind  their poor performance 
in the subsequent years. To address this question I adapted the method of 
Davidsson et al. (2009) by adding a third dimension, the leverage ratio, to the 
analysis. 
In this study, I sorted  Turkey’s top 1000   industrial firms   by 8 categories  
using the median values of  three variables, sales growth rates, ROA and leverage 
ratio (debt / liabilities) as category borders. Figure 1 depicts these 8 categories which  
 




       





Sales growth rate, G 
Median 
                    Figure 1 
                    Categorization of firms by the median values of sales growth     
                    rate, G,  return on assets (ROA) and leverage (debt) ratio 
 
 
are numbered as 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, etc.. For instance, unleveraged poor category, 1a 
(unleveraged-low growth-low profitability firms) includes those firms whose sales 
growth, ROA and debt ratios are below  the median values of these variable in the 
year under consideration.  Industry affiliates of firms are controlled by subtracting 
industry median values from individual firm data. Hence, all three variables used, 
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here, are in deviation form. 1-year transition probabilities of  firms from the original 
(initial) state k to the destination state m  will be shown as pkm where k, m = 1a, 1b, 
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The rows of the transition matrix, P, sum to 1. First row denotes percentages of firms 
passing from the unleveraged poor (1a) category (initial state) to various categories 
(destination states) from the period t to  t+1. The first column shows the percentage 
of firms arriving to the unleveraged poor (1a) category from various categories at time 
t+1.  
The following  hypotheses will be tested: 
 
H1: Controlling for leverage (indebtedness),  profit firms (Category 3) have a greater 
chance to ascend to an upper state (i.e.  star,  Category 4 ) than  growth firms 
(Category 2)  in subsequent periods. That is,                                
        3424 pp aa > and      3424 pp bb >             (2) 
H2:  Controlling for leverage (indebtedness),  growth firms are more likely than are  
profit firms to transition to a lower state (i.e., poor, Category 1) in subsequent periods. 
That is,                                      
2131 pp aa >  and      2131 pp bb >             (3) 
H3: Leverage  matters with respect to firm’s future performance. Compared to 
leveraged firms, unleveraged firms which finance their growth mostly through 
internally generated funds, will be in a better position concerning future performance. 
That is, the likelihood of ascending to an upper (i.e.,  star) category is lower for  
leveraged firms than for unleveraged ones within the growth and profit categories. 
The same is valid concerning the likelihood of descent to a lower ( poor) state:  7  
Unleveraged firms  are in a better position than are  leveraged ones regarding 
transition to the poor category in the next period. That is,  
H3a:         4 2 4 2 b a p p >                    and                 4 3 4 3 b a p p >               (4) 
H3b:        1 2 1 2 b a p p <                      and                 1 3 1 3 b a p p <                (5) 
 
H4: If  our first two hypotheses, H1 and H2, are true, that is, the main driving force 
behind the firm’s future performance  is profitability, not growth, then, we can expect 
no significant  difference between profit (low growth-high profitability) and star (high 
on both) firms and between growth (high growth-low profitability) and poor (low on 
both) firms regarding   the likelihood of their future transitions to a lower or higher 
states. So, we predict: 
 
H4a:            1 4 1 3 a a p p =                 and               1 4 1 3 b b p p =                (6) 
H4b:            4 4 4 3 a a p p =               and                4 4 4 3 b b p p =               (7) 
H4c:             2111 pp aa =                 and                 2111 pp bb =                 (8) 
H4d:             2414 pp aa =                and                 2414 pp bb =              (9) 
 
Hypothesis H4a says that  unleveraged profit (3a) and unleveraged star (4a)  
firms have equal likelihood to descend to the lower category 1 (poor firms) in the 
subsequent periods, and the same is valid for their leveraged counterparts (i.e., 3b 
and 4b). 
Hypothesis H4b indicates that controlling for leverage, the chance of  profit 
firms to ascend to an upper state (i.e., star) is equal to the chance of star firms to be 
at the same state in the subsequent periods  (for star firms there is no more an upper 
state to ascend). 
Hypotheses H4c and H4d argue that controlling for leverage, the likelihood of 
moving to a lower ( an upper) state in subsequent periods for growth and poor firms 
are equal.  Since there is no more a lower state for poor firms,  the likelihood of their 
staying in the poor state in the subsequent periods is taken as their probability of 
transition to a lower state. 
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Data 
 
 I used data on the top 1000 Turkish industrial firms collected by the Istanbul 
Chamber of Industry (ISO). Our sample covers the period 1997-2009,  but the year 
1997 is lost due to the calculation of sales growth rate. Only private companies are 
included in the sample. Because of new entries to and exits from the top 1000 list 
each year, the panel is naturally unbalanced. There are  6310 firm-year observations 
in the panel. In order to control the industry effects, industry median values of the 
variables are  subtracted from the firm data, that is,  
     tj itj it x X x - =    ,    J i˛  
Where   itj X  denotes sales growth rate, ROA and debt ratio of  firm  i  which is a 
member of industry j,  tj x  the median value of the variable under consideration in  
industry j at time t. Sales growth rate, G, and return on assets (ROA, profits before 
tax divided by liabilities) are used as proxies for firm growth and profitability. External 
funds (debt) / Total assets ratio is used as the leverage ratio. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
 1-year transition percentages of firms listed in Turkey’s top 1000  across the 8 
firm categories (states) are presented  in Table 1. Most important probabilities of 
Table 1 for our hypotheses  are visualized in Figure 2 to make the issue clearer.  
Besides 1-year transition probabilities 3-year  transition probabilities are also  given in  
Figure 2 in order to follow firms’ transitions in the long run.  Results of z-test for  the 
equality of related percentages are given in Table 2. We can summarize our findings 
as follows: 
 i.  As seen from the z-test results given in Table 2, the data strongly support 
our two hypotheses, H1 and H2. Controlling for leverage, profit (low growth - high 
profitability) firms outperform  growth (high growth - low profitability) firms on both 
directions of transition to an upper state (star) and  a lower state (poor).  While 37.6% 
of the  unleveraged profit ( Category 3a) and 32.7% of the  leveraged profit firms  
(Category 3b) ascends to an upper state (i.e., star category) in the next period, only  
20.9% of the unleveraged growth (Category 2a) and 15.9% of the leveraged growth 
(Category 2b) firms are able to  move  the star category (See, Figures 2).  Hence,  9  
controlling  firm leverage does not change the result  found by Davidsson et al. 
(2009) that  low growth – high profitability (profit) firms have higher chance to move  
to an upper state than high growth – low profitability (growth)  firms.  
Since the 3-year transition probabilities  can be taken as long run path of firms, 
the non-rejection of our hypotheses H1 and H2 indicates that  the superiority of profit 
firms over growth firms concerning future performance is not only a short run 
phenomenon, but it is also valid  in the long run. 




1-year transition percentages  for Turkish top 1000 data 
Destination state (t+1) 
Initial 
State (t) ﬂ   1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b Total 
1a  0.330  0.100  0.189  0.069  0.110  0.009  0.178  0.014  1.000 
1b 0.036  0.389  0.030  0.305  0.022  0.062  0.037  0.118  1.000 
2a 0.319  0.086  0.231  0.067  0.084  0.004  0.151  0.058  1.000 
2b 0.037  0.367  0.045  0.293  0.024  0.074  0.038  0.121  1.000 
3a 0.133  0.037  0.059  0.019  0.352  0.024  0.350  0.026  1.000 
3b 0.032  0.219  0.011  0.146  0.095  0.170  0.108  0.219  1.000 
4a 0.090  0.030  0.057  0.036  0.352  0.017  0.361  0.057  1.000 
4b 0.022  0.200  0.016  0.134  0.075  0.189  0.082  0.282  1.000 
Total 0.110  0.181  0.070  0.139  0.159  0.060  0.178  0.102  1.000 

















Figure  2  
1-year and  3-year ( in parenthesis) transition probabilities of  
unleveraged (a) and leveraged (b) growth and profit  firms to the poor 
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Table 2 
One-tailed z tests for null hypothesis of  equality of  proportions for 1 and 









hypothesis              z  p-value                z  p-value 
H1  3424 pp aa >  
3.08  0.001  1.61  0.054 
 
3424 pp bb >   3.25  0.001  1.94  0.026 
H2 
2131 pp aa >   4.84  0.000  1.99  0.023 
        2131 pp bb >   2.73  0.003  2.25  0.012 
H3a  2424 pp ab >   1.00  0.159  1.39  0.082 
 
3434 pp ab >   0.97  0.166  0.88  0.190 
H3b  2121 pp ab <  
0.02  0.492  -1.28  0.100 
 
3131 pp ab <   -1.57  0.058  -0.48  0.316 
  Null hypothesis         
H4a 
1 4 1 3 a a p p =   1.24  0.107  0.22  0.413 
 








4 4 4 3 a a p p =   -1.24  0.107  -0.12  0.452 
 








1 1 1 2 a a p p =   -0.54  0.295  -0.41  0.341 
 
1 1 1 2 b b p p =   -0.61  0.271  0.24  0.405 
H4d 
4 1 4 2 a a p p =   0.31  0.378  0.60  0.264 
 
4 1 4 2 b b p p =   0.10  0.461  0.04  0.484 
 
 
 ii. Our third hypothesis, H3, saying that leverage matters with respect to firm’s 
future performance, is mostly rejected by  the 1-year (short run) transition 
probabilities with one exception:  The hypothesis  3131 pp ab <  is not rejected by the 
data. That is, compared to leveraged profit firms (3b) unleveraged profit firms (3a) 
have a smaller likelihood to move a lower state (poor) in the short run. As for long run 
(3-year) transition probabilities, leverage seems to have a weak effect (p-values of 
0.08 and 0.10) on the long-run transition probabilities of growth firms, but has no 
effect on the transition probabilities of profit firms.  
  12 
 iii. All variants of our fourth hypothesis, H4a to H4d, are strongly supported by 
the data of both 1-year and 3-year transition matrices. The non-rejections of null 
hypotheses H4a and H4b  implies that there is no substantial difference between 
profit and star firms with regards to the probabilities of  their upward and downward 
transitions both in the short and the long run. Similarly, the non-rejections of H4c-H4d 
means that growth (high growth-low profitability) firms are not different from poor (low 
on both) firms regarding short and long run probabilities of their upward and 
downward transitions across states. 
  These results affirm once more the assertion that profitability is the driving 
force behind the future performance of firms and without profitability growth by  itself  
could not lead to financial success. The ineffectiveness of growth by itself (i.e., 
without profitability) in the determination of firm performance in  subsequent periods, 
principally, comes from its nonpersistent nature. Firm growth rates which have very 
low, mostly insignificant, serial correlation coefficients, are  nearly random. For 
instance, the first three autocorrelation coefficients of sales growth rate,G, in our 
sample are -0.0024 (p-value, 0.420),  0.0450 (0.000) and -0.0171 (0.130), 
respectively. 
The difference in future performance between  growth and  profit firms 
increases sharply during the financial crisis years. For instance, in 2001, 68 out of 
113 growth firms (53.5%) descended  to the poor category, whereas this percentage 
is only 18.2 % (24 out of 107 firms) for profit firms. Moreover, the percentages of  
firms ascending  to the star category is 8.7% for growth, but, 39.4% for profit firms 
during the 2001 financial crisis. 
Our  results have some implications for firm managers, investors and policy-
makers as well as for researchers. Growth by itself (independent of profitability) 
should  not be taken as an objective for a firm. High growth-low profitability  
strategies are rarely sustainable. Value of growth for the prosperity of firms should 
not be exaggerated. Since unprofitable rapid growth brings about many adverse 
factors for  value-profit- generation process of firms, it is, mostly,  a signal of illness 
and risk. In our sample, more than 40% of these growth-focused  firms descends to a 
state of low growth-low profitability in the next period. Profitability eventually  leads to 
growth, not the other way around.  Economic policies towards business firms should 
accentuate the importance of profitability and support  value-creation efforts of firms. 
Assessing firms only by their growth performance, neglecting profitability, will lead  13 
industry managers and investors  to very erroneously forecasts about the future 
evolution of these firms. 
A limitation of this study is related with sizes of firms sampled. Since we 
include only private industrial companies listed in Turkey’s top 1000, our sample is 
truncated from below and includes only big firms. Future studies may fill this gap and 





 In this study, I extended  the method of Davidsson et al. (2009)  by 
adding the leverage ratio as a third dimension besides growth and profitability to 
categorize firms. This extension  enabled me to control for leverage in comparing  the 
performance of  growth and  profit  firms in the subsequent periods. I classified  
Turkey’s top 1000   industrial firms  into 8 categories  using the median values of  
three variables, sales growth rates, ROA and leverage ratio (debt / liabilities) as 
category borders. Using the terminology of Davidsson et al. (2009), these categories 
are called  growth (high growth-low profitability), profit (low growth-high profitability), 
poor (low on both) and star (high on both) categories, each of which are separated  
into unleveraged and leveraged sub-categories in turn using the median leverage 
ratio as a yardstick.  
 Results for both  1-year (short-run)  and 3-year (long-run) transition matrices 
strongly support our two hypotheses, H1 and H2. Controlling for leverage, profit  firms 
outperform growth  firms on both directions of transition, to an upper state (star) or to 
a lower state (poor).  Thus the superiority of profit firms over growth firms concerning 
their future performance is not only a short run phenomenon, but it is a persistent 
one.  
 Our third hypothesis, H3, arguing that leverage matters with respect to firm’s 
future performance, is mostly rejected by  1-year (short run) transition probabilities, 
but weakly supported by 3-year transition data. Being unleveraged or leveraged 
seems to have a weak effect on the long-run transition probabilities of growth firms, 
but has no effect on the transition probabilities of profit firms.  
 All variants of our fourth hypothesis, H4a to H4d, are strongly supported by the 
data of both 1-year and 3-year transition matrices, indicating that there is no  14 
substantial difference (i) between profit and star firms and (ii) between growth and 
poor firms concerning their future upward and downward transitions across 
categories (states).  This result is resolute evidence supporting  the claim that 
profitability, not growth, is the driving force behind  firm performance. The view that 
high growth could, eventually, lead to high profitability is strongly rejected by the data 
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Table A1 
1-year transition matrix  
Destination state (t+1) 
Initial 
State (t) ﬂ   1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b Total 
1a  211  64  121  44  70  6  114  9  639 
1b 38  405  31  318  23  65  39  123  1042 
2a 148  40  107  31  39  2  70  27  464 
2b 35  345  42  276  23  70  36  114  941 
3a 130  36  58  19  344  23  342  25  977 
3b 12  81  4  54  35  63  40  81  370 
4a 107  35  67  43  416  20  427  68  1183 
4b 15  139  11  93  52  131  57  196  694 
Total 696  1145  441  878  1002  380  1125  643  6310 
 
Table A2 
3-year transition matrix 
Destination state (t+3)  Initial 
State (t) 
ﬂ   1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b Total 
1a 84  54  56  38  64  5  64  21  386 
1b 40  196  27  151  40  41  39  65  599 
2a 74  36  53  35  42  5  65  21  331 
2b 48  189  34  133  23  55  38  65  585 
3a 106  43  50  24  193  16  211  27  670 
3b 16  48  10  36  42  26  28  48  254 
4a 111  61  39  50  238  20  252  39  810 
4b 21  96  12  88  40  55  48  96  456 
Total 500  723  281  555  682  223  745  382  4091 
 
Table A3 
3-year transition probabilities  matrix 
Destination state (t+3)  Initial 
State (t) 
ﬂ   1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b Total 
1a  0.218  0.14  0.145  0.098  0.166  0.013  0.166  0.054  1.000 
1b 0.067  0.327  0.045  0.252  0.067  0.068  0.065  0.109  1.000 
2a 0.224  0.109  0.16  0.106  0.127  0.015  0.196  0.063  1.000 
2b 0.082  0.323  0.058  0.227  0.039  0.094  0.065  0.111  1.000 
3a 0.158  0.064  0.075  0.036  0.288  0.024  0.315  0.04  1.000 
3b 0.063  0.189  0.039  0.142  0.165  0.102  0.11  0.189  1.000 
4a 0.137  0.075  0.048  0.062  0.294  0.025  0.311  0.048  1.000 
4b 0.046  0.211  0.026  0.193  0.088  0.121  0.105  0.211  1.000 
Total 0.122  0.177  0.069  0.136  0.167  0.055  0.182  0.093  1.000 
 